CASE NAME- The Charming Betsy case
PARTIES– Murray Vs. The Charming Betsey
YEAR– 1804
PRINCIPLE–
· Charming Betsy canon is a principle of interpretation applied in interpreting national statutes, and general acts of congress. According to this canon, national statutes should be interpreted in such a way that the interpretation does not conflict with international laws. This principle evolved from the case.
· Another principle of this case is in the treaty or custom the state have to maintain though it is clarified or not. The states have to bind to maintain this kind of treaty or custom. Even if the Domestic Law as inter-related to the International Law for the treaty rules or custom.
Once a US national lived in the island named sent Thor conquered by the Denmark. He was the owner of a ship. In 1800 by the Non Intercourse Act his ship was forfeited. By t his there was no business transitive allowed with France. There was the allegation brought against him for breaching this Act. There were a number of reasons had been produce that so far he had been living in abroad.
- Whether the U.S authority can forfeit her national’s property solely for staying an abroad or not.
- Whether U.S. Navy had violated the Non-Intercourse Act of 1800.
In the dispute the chief justice Marshall to do the judgment. Discussed and interpreted the international country law, conventional law and the effectiveness over the USA of its. According to his decisions, that any law of USA can’t be operated in opposition direction of the international norm and International Laws.
- There is lots of reasoning he produced in giving of its decision. He said the customary law has been found into US law with effectiveness. That is why the congress never can go in the opposite.
- Over the dispute, the allegation which was brought really by the national control of the USA. The crate can do no matter what it seems to better for the state. As it was the Act passed in the congress which was not to be opposing of the International Law.
- The court found that there was sue connection exist to go to the step for the discharge the argument.
CASE NAME– The Barcelona Traction Case
PARTY- Belgium v. Spain
YEAR- 1962–1970
PRINCIPLE–
Principle of protection of company by company’s national state company incorporate in third party.
FACT OF THE CASE-
The Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd., (hereinafter called Barcelona Traction) were a Canadian joint stock company formed in Toronto (Canada) in 1911. The greater part of its share capital belonged to Belgian nationals. Barcelona Traction also owned the shares of several other companies, some of which were operating in Spain under Spanish law.
Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company, Ltd. (Barcelona Traction) manufactured and supplied electricity in Spain. Although doing business in Spain, it was incorporated in Canada and maintained its headquarters in Toronto. The company issued corporate bonds to investors outside of Spain. During the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), the government of Spain refused to allow Barcelona Traction to transfer currency from Spain to pay interest to the bondholders. The interest payments were never resumed.
In 1948, several Spaniards purchased some of the bonds and then brought suit in a Spanish court asking it to declare Barcelona Traction bankrupt because it had failed to pay the interest on the bonds. The court did so and, following several motions and appeals, all of the assets in Spain belonging to the company were finally sold by public auction in 1952. The proceeds from the sale were distributed to creditors and only a very small sum was to be paid to shareholders.
The shareholders then sought the assistance of their home states in seeking to obtain a larger settlement. Canada, among other states, complained to Spain of denials of justice and of the violation of certain treaties it alleged were applicable. Canada, however, eventually agreed that Spain had acted properly in denying Barcelona Traction the right to transfer currency abroad and later in declaring the company bankrupt.
Belgium took an interest in the matter because Belgians owned 88 percent of the shares in Barcelona Traction. It disagreed that Spain had acted properly and after Spain became a member of the United Nations in 1955, Belgium filed a complaint before the International Court of Justice in 1958. The proceedings were suspended and then discontinued while representatives of the private interests concerned carried on negotiations. When the negotiations failed, Belgium submitted a new application to the Court in 1962.
Spain promptly objected that Belgium could not sponsor Barcelona Traction’s or its shareholders’ complaints because Barcelona Traction was a Canadian company.
ISSUE-
Belgium claimed that the Spanish authorities acted contrary to international law against Barcelona Traction, which resulted in damage to the company and its shareholders. Accordingly, Spain was under an obligation to restore in full to Barcelona Traction its property, rights and interests, and ensure compensation for all other losses. Alternatively, Spain should pay Belgium compensation equivalent to the value of the property, rights and interests of Barcelona Traction. As another alternative, Spain should at least pay to Belgium compensation equivalent to the amount of shares of the capital of Barcelona Traction owned by Belgian nationals, together with the amount of the sums standing due on 12 February 1948 in favor of Belgian nationals. Before the Court could proceed with the matter on the basis of the memorial filed by Belgium and the preliminary objection raised by Spain, Belgium informed the Court, in accordance with Article 89 of the Rules of the Court that it wished to withdraw from the case. Later Belgium and Spain engaged in negotiations, but as these did not result in any agreement, Belgium presented a new application in 1992 for the Court to hear the case.
DECESION-
The international court of justice rejected the claim of Belgium by fifteen one votes holding that Belgian Govt. had no “locus standi” in this case to seek reparation.
REASONING-
The Belgian government lacked the standing to exercise diplomatic protection of Belgian shareholders in a Canadian company with respect to measures taken against that company in Spain. The court ruled on the side of the Spanish, holding that only the nationality of the corporation (the Canadians) can sue. The case is important as it demonstrates how the concept of diplomatic protection under international law can apply equally to corporations as to individuals.
Lotus case
PARTY- France and Turkey
YEAR- 1927
-Criminal jurisdiction and flag State jurisdiction on the high seas.
On 2 August 1926, a collision occurred on the high seas between the French mail steamer Lotusproceeding to Constantinople, and the Turkish collier, “Boz-Kourt”. The “Boz-Kourt” sank and eight Turkish nationals perished. On 3 August, the Lotusarrived in Constantinople; Where the Turkish authorities proceeded to hold an enquiry into the collision. They instituted joint criminal proceedings in accordance with the Turkish law against the captain of the “Boz-Kourt”, and the officer on watch on board the Lotus at the time of the collision, Lieutenant Demons, a French citizen, on a charge of manslaughter.
The case was first heard on 28 August 1926 before the Criminal Court of Istanbul. Lieutenant Demons’ objection to the jurisdiction of the Court was overruled. On 15 September, the Criminal Court of Istanbul sentenced Demons to a short term of imprisonment and fine.The proceedings had been instituted in pursuance of Turkish legislation. According to the French Government, the Criminal Court claimed jurisdiction under Article 6 of the Turkish PenalCode.20 the French Government protested against the arrest of Lieutenant Demons and against the assumption of jurisdiction by the Turkish Court. By a special agreement, signed at Geneva on 12 October 1926 between the French and Governments and filed with the Registry of the Court in accordance with article 40 of the Statute and article 35 of the Rules of the Court, the latter submitted to the Permanent Court of Justice the question of jurisdiction that had arisen between them as a result of the collision.
§ Criminal jurisdiction and flag State jurisdiction on the high seas. Questions before the Court Has Turkey, contrary to article 15 of the Convention of Lausanne of 24 July 192321 on conditions of residence, business and jurisdiction, acted in conflict with the principles of international law.
§ And, if so, which principles, by instituting joint proceedings in pursuance of Turkish law against Lieutenant Demons, in consequence of the loss of the “Boz-Kourt” having involved the death of eight Turkish sailors and passengers?
§ Should the reply be in the affirmative, is any pecuniary reparation due to Lieutenant Demons according to the principles of international law and, if so, what should it be?
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Judgment was rendered on 7 September 1927. By the President’s casting vote – the votes being equally divided – the Court held that
- Turkey, by instituting criminal proceedings against Lieutenant Demons, had not in conflict with the principles of international law;
- Consequently, there was no occasion to give judgment on the question of the pecuniary reparation.
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The Court first established that the question submitted to it was whether the principles of international law prevented Turkey from instituting criminal proceedings against Lieutenant Demons under Turkish law. The Court found that the French contention that Turkey, in order to have jurisdiction, should be able to point to some title of jurisdiction recognized by international law was opposed to generally accepted international law, as referred to by Article 15. It stated that the first restriction imposed by international law upon a State was that it could not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. However, this did not imply that international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory in respect of any case that relates to acts that have taken place abroad and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law. The Court found that Turkish jurisdiction was justifiable not because of the nationality of the victims but because the effects of the offence were produced on a Turkish ship, and consequently, in a place “assimilated to Turkish territory in which the application of Turkish criminal law cannot be challenged”. Once it was admitted that the effects of the offence were produced on the Turkish vessel, it became impossible to hold that there was a rule of international law that prohibited Turkey from prosecuting Lieutenant Demons simply because the author of the offence was on board the French ship.
The Court then addressed the last argument advanced by the French Government that according to international law criminal proceedings arising from collision cases are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State whose flag is flown. France claimed that questions of jurisdiction in collision cases were rarely encountered in the practice of criminal courts. Therefore, prosecutions only occurred before the courts of the State whose flag is flown, which proved a tacit adherence by States to the rule of positive international law barring prosecutions by other States. The Court rejected this argument. Even if the facts alleged were true, they would merely show that States had often abstained from instituting criminal proceedings, not that they felt obligated to do so.
United Kingdom v. Norway, ICJ
1951
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Extension by costal state of fisheries jurisdiction case, fishery zone, preferential rights and concurrent rights of other stats and conservation measures.
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Since 1911 British trawlers had been seized and condemned for violating measures taken by the Parties in order to avoid further legal differences; and the Norwegian Government specifying the limits within which fishing was prohibited to foreigners. In 1935, a Decree was adopted establishing the lines of delimitation of the Norwegian fisheries zone
On 28 September 1949, the Government of the United Kingdom filed with the Registry ofthe ICJ an application instituting proceedings against Norway. The subject of the proceedings the Parties in order to avoid further legal differences; and the validity, under international law, of the lines of delimitation of the Norwegian fisheries zone as set forth in a Decree of 12 July 1935.
The application referred to the declarations by which the United Kingdom and Norway had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in accordance with Article 36 (2) of its Statute.
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· To declare the principles of international law applicable in defining the baselines by reference to which the Norwegian Government was entitled to delimit a fisherieszone, extending seaward to 4 nautical miles from those lines and exclusively reserved for its own nationals; and to define the said baselines in the light of the arguments of the Parties in order to avoid further legal differences.
· To award damages to the Government of the United Kingdom in respect of all the written reply and later in the oral argument by the United Kingdom and, consequently, no interferences by the Norwegian authorities with British fishing vessels outside the fisheries zone, which, in accordance with the ICJ’s decision, the Norwegian Government may be entitled to reserve for its nationals.
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The Fisheries Case was brought before the Court by the United Kingdom of Great; Britain and Northern Ireland against Norway. By a Decree of July 12th, 1935, the Norwegian Government had, in the northern part of the country (north of the Arctic Circle) delimited the zone in which the fisheries were reserved to its own nationals.
‘Me United Kingdom asked the Court to state whether this delimitation was or was not contrary to international law. In, its Judgment the Court found that neither the method employed for the delimitation by the Decree, nor the lines themselves fixed by the said I)decree, are contrary to international law; the first finding is adopted by ten votes to two, and the second by eight votes to four. Three Judges-M.M. Alvalez, Hackworth and Hsu Mo appended to the Judgment; 21 declaration or an individual opinion stating the particular reasons for which they reached their conclusions; two other Judges- Sir Arnold McNair and Mr. J.E. Read-appended to the Judgment statements Of their dissenting Opinions.
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- It was agreed from the outset by both Parties and by the Court that Norway had the right to claim a 4-mile belt of territorial sea, that the fjords and sands along the coastline, which have the character of a bay or of legal straits, should be considered Norwegian for historical reasons, and that the territorial sea should be measured from the line of the low-water mark.
- The Court found itself obliged to decide whether the relevant low-water mark was that of the mainland or of the skjaergaard, and concluded that it was the outer line of the skjaergaard that must be taken into account in delimiting the belt of Norwegian territorial waters.
- The Court then considered the three methods that had been contemplated to effect the application of the low-water mark. The Court rejected the method of the “tracé parallèle”, which” consists of drawing the outer limit of the belt of territorial waters by following the coast in all its sinuosities”, as unsuitable for so rugged a coast. Furthermore, that method was abandoned in the written reply and later in the oral argument by the United Kingdom and, consequently, no longer relevant to the case.
- The Court also declined to apply the “courbe tangente” (the “arcs of circles” method) inasmuch as it was concededly not obligatory by law. Thus, the instant case required the application of a third delimitation method according to which the belt of the territorial waters must follow the general direction of the coast. Such a method consisted of selecting appropriate points on the low-water mark and drawing straight lines between them. The Court found that the method had already been applied by a number of States without giving rise to any protests by other States.
- However, the Court held that the delimitation of sea areas had always had an international aspect and could not be dependent merely upon the will of the coastal State as expressed in its municipal law. Although necessarily a unilateral act, the validity of delimitation of sea areas with regard to other States depended upon international law. The Court considered that in drawing straight baselines, the coastal State had to follow the general direction of the coast.
CASE NAME– The Continental Shelf CASE
PARTY-Libyan Arab Jamahiriya vs. Malta
YEAR-1985
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It is a course axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to be looked for primary in the actual practice and opinion juries of state even though multilateral conventions may have an important role to play in defining and recording rules , deriving from custom or indeed in developing them.
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On 23 May 1976, a Special Agreement was signed between the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Republic of Malta providing for the submission to the Court of a dispute concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two States.
The Parties were broadly in agreement as to the sources of the law applicable to the case, but disagreed as to the way in which the Court was to indicate the practical application of those principles and rules. Malta wished the Court to draw the delimitation line, while Libya wanted it only to pronounce itself on the applicable principles and rules. Having examined the intention of the Parties to the Special Agreement, from which its jurisdiction derived, the Court considered that it was not barred by the terms of the SpecialAgreement from indicating a delimitation line. The delimitation contemplated by the Special Agreement related only to the areas of continental shelf that appertained to the Parties, to the exclusion of areas which might appertain to a third State. Although the Parties had in effect invited the Court not to limit its Judgment to the area in which theirs were the sole competing claims, the Court did not consider itself free to do so, especially in view of the interest shown in the proceedings by Italy, which in 1984 order to achieve an equitable result. Submitted an application for permission to intervene under article 62 of the Statute. The Court had rejected this application.
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Questions before the Court
· What principles and rules of international law are applicable to the delimitation of the area of the continental shelf that appertains to the Republic of Malta and the area of the continental shelf that appertains to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya?
· How in practice can the two Parties, in this particular case, apply such principles and order to achieve an equitable result. Rules in order that they may, without difficulty, delimit the areas concerned by agreement?
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The Judgment was rendered on 3 June 1985. By fourteen votes to three, the Court held that “with reference to the areas of continental shelf between the coasts of the Parties within the low-water mark of the relevant coast of Libya, that initial line being then limits defined in the present Judgment, namely the meridian 13º 50′ E and the meridian 15º 10′ E.
The principles and rules of international law applicable for the delimitation, to be effected by agreement in implementation of the present Judgment, of the areas of continental shelf appertaining to the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and to the Republic of Malta respectively are as follows:
· the delimitation is to be effected in accordance with equitable principles and taking account of all relevant circumstances, so as to arrive at an equitable result;
· The area of continental shelf to be found to appertain to either Party not extending more than 200 miles from the coast of the Party concerned, no criterion for delimitation of shelf areas can be derived from the principles of natural prolongation in the physical sense.
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The Court found that, as to the law applicable to the delimitation of areas of shelfbetween neighboring States, which is governed by article 83 of the 1982 Convention, theConvention sets a goal to be pursued, namely “to achieve an equitable solution” but is silent as tothe method to achieve it.
In the view of the Court, the principles and rules underlying the régime of the exclusive economic zone could not be left out of consideration in the present case, the two concepts continental shelf and exclusive economic zone – being linked together in modern law.
The conclusion reached by the Court was that there was no evident disproportion in theareas of shelf attributed to each of the Parties respectively such that it could be said that the requirements of the test of proportionality as an aspect of equity were not satisfied.
CASE NAME- The
PARTIES– United Nation vs. Israel
YEAR-1949
PRINCIPLE-
United Nations Organization is an international institution and legal person under international law. Therefore it is a subject of international law and capable of possessing rights and duties.
FACT OF THE CASE-
In 1947 when Palestine spited in to two countries, Israel emerged as a new country. At that time the UN troops were engaged in the border area of Israel and Palestine of monitoring and peacekeeping and to mediate in the conflict between Arabs and Jews. Mr. Count Bernadette, a Dutch national, was the chief UN truce negotiator for the area. On September 17,1948 when he as in the area of Jerusalem, the area which was under the occupation of Israel, was murdered.
The UN considered that Israel was negligent in duty and was fail to punish the murderers. Consequently the UN decided to make a claim for compensation on behalf of its employee under international law. Does UN capable at all to claim compensation or not the United Nations General Assembly sought advice of ICJ in this regard.
ISSUE-
The issues of this case were as follows:
- Whether The United Nations as an organization can claim compensation and damages for the person appointed under its service.
- Whether UN as international organization has every legal responsibility so that it can be sued and can sue by its own name.
- Whether the UN had the capability to bring an international calm for compensation against a non member state.
DECESION-
The ICJ held that UN as an international institution and legal person, it enjoys all the qualities privileges and claim reparation not only in respect of damages caused to itself but also in respect of damage suffered by the victim persons. Thus the Israel is liable to pay compensation.
REASONING-
The court observed that United Nation Organization is a political body charged with political tasks of important character and covering a wide field, namely the maintenance of international peace and security, achieve international co operation in the pasture of economic social cultural rights. It is a present the supreme type of international organization and it could not carry out the intention of its founders if it was devoid as international character. The court has come to the conclusion that this organization is an international person and it can be assumed that the organization has the capacity to bring a claim on an international plane, to negotiation, to conclude a special agreement and to prosecute a claim before an international tribunal. The organization has the capacity to claim reparation of damage by basing its clam upon a breach of obligation due to itself and this will bring about settlement.
Prof. Nurul Islam and Others Govt. of Bangladesh and others Case
1999
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Island of Palmas Case
– Netherlands Vs USA
1928
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The Island of Palmas Case dealing with island disputes. It involved a Sparsely inhabited island twenty nautical miles off the southwest coast of the Philippines. The United States and the Netherlands contested ownership of the island. The United States claimed the Island of Palmas based on two legal theories. First, Spain’s earlier “discovery” of the island, which had given Spain “original title,” passed to the United States when the United States defeated Spain in the Spanish-American War and the United States took possession of the Philippines. Second, the United States claimed Palmas Island due to the contiguity of the island to the Philippines. When Spain first discovered the Island of Palmas in the sixteenth century, international law arguably granted absolute title to islands that were terra nullius to the discoverer. The United States, therefore, argued that this law, the law at the time of discovery, should apply and international law at that time granted title to terra nullius to its discoverer. On the other hand, the Netherlands claimed the island because the Netherlands had had contact with the region, and they contended that the island was a “tributary of native princes, [who were] vassals of the Netherlands Government.” Moreover, regarding the applicable law, the Netherlands countered the United States’ argument of the United States regarding applicable law by stating that, “[t]he changed conceptions of law developing in later times cannot be ignored in judging the continued legal value of relations which, instead of being consummated and terminated at one single moment, are of a permanent character.”
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It was held that by the ICJ, that the arbitrator then held that though the U.S. had inchoate title to the Island of Palmas, based on its ascension to possession of the Philippines through earlier Spanish discovery, the Netherlands had actual title to the island because it had peacefully and continuously displayed authority over the island.
Next, although the Island of Palmas was much closer to the Philippines than Indonesia, the court rejected the United States’ “contiguity” claim, concluding that international law did not support such a principle. Consequently, the rule in international law stated that discovery, without any further display of authority or occupation of an island, did not demonstrate ownership where another State exercised actual authority over the same islands.
The territorial sovereignty was absence from the sides of the continues effectiveness sovereignty over the land by Netherlands. So mere discovered is not okay to be territorial sovereignty. Spain did not fulfill the requirement of having the land through terra nullius.
Clipperton Island Arbitration Case
PARTIES– France Vs México, 26AJIL 390
1932
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The Clipperton Island Case involved a dispute between Mexico and France over a small, uninhabited island 600 miles southwest of Mexico. Mexico claimed the island based on Spanish discovery several hundred years earlier. France argued that it obtained title in November 1858 after a French naval ship discovered the island, and its commanding officer later published France’s claim in a newspaper. After “discovering” Clipperton Island and publishing notice of the discovery in a Hawaii’ newspaper, France took no further action to assert her sovereignty until 1897, thirty-nine years blather, when a French naval ship found three Americans collecting guano on the island. France protested to the United States, which responded that it made no claim to the island. A month later, Mexico, believing that Clipperton Island was under its possession, and having heard about the same guano exploration, dispatched a naval ship to investigate. The ship found the same three Americans on the island and Mexican soldiers raised the Mexican flag. France protested Mexico’s action, and both sides engaged in an acrimonious debate over ownership of the island, until both parties agreed to have their dispute arbitrated by Emperor Victor Emmanuel III of Italy in 1909. Victor Emmanuel, however, would not issue his ruling on the case for twenty-two years, until 1931. The Emperor awarded Clipperton Island to France, stating that “the proof of an historic right of Mexico’s is not supported by any manifestation of her sovereignty over the island, a sovereignty never exercised until the expedition of 1897.
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The discovery of the island by the Spanish authority was not sufficiently proved, nor was the title of Spain to the territory. Meanwhile, it was clear that France had not at any point abandoned her claim to the island. In the circumstances, sovereignty over the islands belonged to France.
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In 17th November 1858 Clipperton Island was legitimately acquired by French. France did not lose subsequently right by dereliction. France never had the animus of abandoning the island and it had not exercised its authority their positive manner. From 17th November 1858, for this reason France belongs the sovereignty over the Clipperton Island.
Eastern Greenland Case, PCIJ
Denmark vs. Norway
1933
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To established effective occupation two elements are must needed-
FACT OF THE CASE
The sovereignty of Denmark over Greenland was established upon 1721. Actually , the conflict was began from 10th July 1931, when Norway declared through Royal Proclamation that cast terra- nullius was under their control and they raised the flag of Norway. But Denmark considered the island as their own as after World War 1. The allied power countries agreed that the actual control of the country should be under Denmark. Denmark again claims that there here ruling the area for a long time and it also shows its authority. So Denmark took the dispute to PCIJ.
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v Where the country practically occupied or not
v Where the country has any legal titled
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The court agreed that the actual control of the country and all evidence is sufficient that is the land should be under Denmark.
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To established effective occurred two elements are must be needed-
The Temple of Preah Vihear Case, ICJ
Cambodia vs. Thailand
1967
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- The action of Poland was not expropriation in its real sense, it was rather a seizure of property, right and interest which could not be expropriated even against compensation, save under the special conditions fixed by Art. 7 of the Upper Silesia convention of 1922. in doing so, therefore, Poland acted contrary to its obligations.
- It is general principle of international law and even a general concept of law that a breach of an agreement involves a duty to make reparation.
- Reparation is the expendable complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself. This case is one of an unlawful expropriation and in such cases expropriating sates must in addition to paying the compensation due in respect of lawful expropriation, pay also damages for any loss continued by the injured party.
- <span style=” principle which subjects the act creative of a right to the law in force at the time the right arises, demands that the existence of the right, in other words its continued manifestation, shall follow the conditions required by the evolution of the law
- The territory if occupied it is not enough to the state who occupied the territory which is belong upon the state. The state should have the authoritative power of the territory he relationship and sovereignty with the inter-connection between the occupied territory.
- Whether Netherlands had any legal rights or not.
- Whether the Island was terra nu the territory if occupied it is not enough to the state who occupied the territory which is belong upon the state. The state should have the authoritative power of the territory he relationship and sovereignty with the inter-connection between the occupied territory terra nullius or not.
- A territory, by virtue of the fact that it was completely uninhabited is, from the first moment when the occupying state makes its appearance there, at the absolute and undisputed disposition of that state, from that moment the taking of possession must be considered as accomplished, and the occupation is thereby completed.
- The occupation on Territory not on the occupied the land or territory it is insufficient but also necessary to effective on that occupation of the territory.
- Whether there is any authoritative power over the territory in the Spain.
- Whether France or Mexico had title to the island.
- Whether Mexico had any title belongs over the island.
- Whether it provides a lower occupation requirement to prove actual title where the territory claimed is an uninhabited island.
- Land occupation for exercising sovereignty
- Effective expression for the will.
- Land occupation for exercising sovereignty and
- Effective expression for the will.
- The international law elements of the case are territorial sovereignty, and the power of treaties.
- The Court weighed heavily the historical context of the creation of Annex I in making its judgment. It is clear that the Court found it important to first clarify the frontier lines between Cambodia and Thailand before deciding the issue of sovereignty. Because one could not be correctly judged without the other, the principles of subject-matter jurisdiction, temporal jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction are all important in this case.
- The power of treaties held Thailand accountable for the border dispute and allowed Cambodia to expel Thai forces from the Temple.